This article asks a question that the sanctions literature has posed for many target states but not yet answered for Venezuela in quantitative terms: as Washington tightened unilateral coercive measures between 2014 and 2025, did the resulting pressure push the country toward genuine import-substituting reindustrialization, or did it merely reroute the existing oil complex toward new buyers while domestic industry kept contracting? Drawing on a mixed-method de- sign that couples a transparently coded Sanctions Intensity Index (SII) with two outcome series, the Eastward Reorientation Share (ERS) of crude exports and a manufacturing value-added in- dex, I test three hypotheses on the substitution and diversion effects of sanctions. The central empirical finding is novel for this case. Sanctions intensity is strongly and positively associated with the eastward diversion of Venezuelan crude toward China (Pearson r = 0.905), yet that diversion is sharply decoupled from any domestic industrial recovery: the correlation between the reorientation share and manufacturing value added is strongly negative (r = -0.893), and sanctions intensity tracks the collapse of manufacturing almost one-to-one (r = -0.952). In plain terms, what occurred was external buyer-substitution, not internal productive substitution. The pe- trostate adapted at the level of who buys its oil, not at the level of what it makes. These results qualify the optimistic reading of sanctions as a spur to industrial self-reliance and specify the mechanism, asymmetric resource dependence under coercion, through which diversion crowds out reindustrialization. The contribution is one verifiable, replicable relationship, built from pub- lic data and a documented coding rubric, that future work can extend with proprietary cargo- tracking series.