pp. 9–31·Published: 11 October 2026· Issue No. 2

Modernization of the armament of the bolivarian armed Forces: Russian and Chinese military technology transfers To Venezuela before and after maduro's assumption of power

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Rosa Hernandez SanchezORCID 0009-0002-0351-785X
DOI: 10.65932/military-studies-2026-2-1Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 CC BY 4.0
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Modernization of the armament of the bolivarian armed Forces: Russian and Chinese military technology transfers To Venezuela before and after maduro's assumption of power
Venezuela conducted the most ambitious military modernization in Latin America of the early twenty-first century, absorbing approximately 11 billion US dollars of Russian defense articles between 2001 and 2013 and becoming the largest buyer of Russian weapons in the West- ern Hemisphere. The aim of this article is to explain why an armament program of this magnitude proved strategically unsustainable, and to measure that unsustainability in a replicable way. The research applies a mixed methodological approach combining longitudinal analysis of arms-trans- fer data (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, IISS Military Balance), comparative analysis of the pre- Maduro (2005–2013) and Maduro (2013–2025) periods, and a structured case study of Russian and Chinese transfer channels. The original contribution of the article is the Transferred-Capa- bility Sustainability Index (TCSI), a five-dimension composite metric (financing continuity, maintenance autonomy, technology absorption, human capital retention, supplier commitment) that quantifies the degree to which an import-based modernization survives the interruption of its enabling conditions. Applied to Venezuela, the TCSI falls from 7.0/10 in the 2005–2013 pe- riod to 3.0/10 in the 2014–2025 period, a 57% decline. Key findings: deliveries of major conven- tional weapons collapsed to near zero after 2016; Venezuela's GDP contracted by more than 80% between 2013 and 2020, removing the fiscal basis of sustainment; by 2019 Russian specialist personnel had to be deployed to Venezuela simply to keep previously delivered equipment oper- ational. The article concludes that the Venezuelan case demonstrates a generalizable proposition: arms-transfer-based modernization without absorption of maintenance, production, and training capacity produces capability that is rented rather than owned, and decays at the speed of the political relationship that financed it.

Venezuela conducted the most ambitious military modernization in Latin America of the early twenty-first century, absorbing approximately 11 billion US dollars of Russian defense articles between 2001 and 2013 and becoming the largest buyer of Russian weapons in the West- ern Hemisphere. The aim of this article is to explain why an armament program of this magnitude proved strategically unsustainable, and to measure that unsustainability in a replicable way. The research applies a mixed methodological approach combining longitudinal analysis of arms-trans- fer data (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, IISS Military Balance), comparative analysis of the pre- Maduro (2005–2013) and Maduro (2013–2025) periods, and a structured case study of Russian and Chinese transfer channels. The original contribution of the article is the Transferred-Capa- bility Sustainability Index (TCSI), a five-dimension composite metric (financing continuity, maintenance autonomy, technology absorption, human capital retention, supplier commitment) that quantifies the degree to which an import-based modernization survives the interruption of its enabling conditions. Applied to Venezuela, the TCSI falls from 7.0/10 in the 2005–2013 pe- riod to 3.0/10 in the 2014–2025 period, a 57% decline. Key findings: deliveries of major conven- tional weapons collapsed to near zero after 2016; Venezuela's GDP contracted by more than 80% between 2013 and 2020, removing the fiscal basis of sustainment; by 2019 Russian specialist personnel had to be deployed to Venezuela simply to keep previously delivered equipment oper- ational. The article concludes that the Venezuelan case demonstrates a generalizable proposition: arms-transfer-based modernization without absorption of maintenance, production, and training capacity produces capability that is rented rather than owned, and decays at the speed of the political relationship that financed it.

Published11 October 2026
Pages9–31
AuthorsRosa Hernandez Sanchez
Languageen