Where does one organism end and its environment begin? The default answer in muchof biology is spatial: the boundary is the outermost membrane, the skin, the cell wall. This articleargues that the membrane is a poor guide to individuality and that the boundary of an organismis better located where information flow closes on itself. I develop the Informational IndividualityCriterion (IIC), a three-axis operationalization that scores any candidate system along informational closure (the contrast between internal predictive mutual information and boundary-crossing mutual information), integrated information (the irreducibility of the system's cause–effectstructure), and constraint-based autonomy (the organizational closure of the constraints thatmaintain the system). On this account, the organismal boundary is the closed surface that maximizes a composite individuality functional, not the surface drawn by lipids or cuticle. I test thecriterion on three cases that break the membrane intuition in opposite directions: the mammalianholobiont, in which many membranes enclose one informational individual; the multinucleatesyncytium, in which one membrane encloses several partly autonomous informational sub-individuals; and the colonial siphonophore, in which many zooid membranes are subordinate to asingle integrated colonial self. Across all three, the informational boundary systematically divergesfrom the physical membrane, and I quantify that gap with a Membrane–Information Divergencediagnostic. The upshot is that individuality is graded, sometimes nested, and frequently displacedfrom the membrane — an outcome that membrane-based criteria cannot represent but that aninformational criterion renders precise and, in principle, measurable.